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Abstract—Data sponsoring is a widely-used incentive method
in today’s cellular networks, where video content providers
(CPs) cover part or all of the cellular data cost for mobile
users so as to attract more video users and increase data
traffic. In the forthcoming 5G cellular networks, edge caching
is emerging as a promising technique to deliver videos with
lower cost and higher quality. The key idea is to cache video
contents on edge networks (e.g., femtocells and WiFi access
points) in advance and deliver the cached contents to local
video users directly (without involving cellular data cost for
users). In this work, we aim to study how the edge caching
will affect the CP’s data sponsoring strategy as well as the
users’ behaviors and the data market. Specifically, we consider
a single CP who offers both the edge caching service and the
data sponsoring service to a set of heterogeneous mobile video
users (with different mobility and video request patterns). We
formulate the interactions of the CP and the users as a two-stage
Stackelberg game, where the CP (leader) determines the budgets
(efforts) for both services in Stage I, and the users (followers)
decide whether and which service(s) they would like to subscribe
to. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
proposed game systematically. Our analysis and experimental
results show that by introducing the edge caching, the CP can
increase his revenue by 105%.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
Nowadays, we are witnessing the explosive growth of
global mobile data traffic. According to Cisco [1], mobile
video traffic accounts for a majority of the total mobile
traffic (e.g., 60% in 2016). Due to the fast increase of video
traffic, the increased data cost is becoming one of the major
concerns for mobile users to watch videos [2]. This brings
additional challenge (and also huge opportunity) for video
content providers (CPs), as they need to consider not only the
quality improvement of their offered video services as before,
but also the cost reduction for the users who request their
services (to attract more video users). Due to the intensive
competition of CPs, the second issue (i.e., reducing user cost)
is becoming increasingly important today [3], [4].
One effective way to reduce user cost is the so-called data
sponsoring [5]–[7], which has been employed by many CPs
worldwide. The key idea is to allow CPs to subsidize the
users’ cost of mobile video data, hence attract more mobile
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video users and traffic. Data sponsoring creates a win-win
situation for mobile users and CPs, that is, mobile users
benefit from the free access of video contents, and CPs
benefit from the increased video users and traffic (through,
for example, selling more built-in advertisements). Thus, we
refer to such a data sponsoring scheme as “cellular data
sponsoring”. As a real-world example, AT&T announced its
sponsored data program in January 2014 [8].
In the forthcoming 5G cellular networks, edge caching
is emerging as a promising technique to deliver videos
with lower cost and higher quality [9], [10]. The key idea
is to cache the popular video contents on edge networks
(e.g., femtocell base stations and WiFi access points) in
advance and deliver the cached contents to local video users
directly via device-to-device connections (e.g., WiFi direct).
Obviously, with edge caching, mobile users can obtain video
contents without incurring the cellular data cost. In this sense,
edge caching can be viewed as a new sponsorship scheme for
mobile users. We refer to such a new sponsoring scheme as
“edge cache sponsoring”. As an example, Xunlei [11], one
of the largest content delivery networks (CDNs) in China,
has deployed WiFi APs with large storage capacity to deliver
video contents for mobile users.
In this work, we will study the mobile video data market
with both sponsoring schemes (as in [12]). We aim to under-
stand how the newly introduced edge caching will affect the
traditional cellular data sponsoring, and how the co-existence
of edge caching and cellular data sponsoring will change the
user behavior and the whole data market.
B. Solution and Contributions
To concentrate on the mutual interaction of edge caching
and cellular data sponsoring, we consider a simple model with
a single CP, who offers both the edge cache sponsoring and
the cellular data sponsoring to mobile users. As in the existing
literature [11]–[13], we assume that the cellular network is
available in the whole area, while the edge network is only
available in part of the area (e.g., hotspots) due to the limited
distance of device-to-device transmission.
By covering the data cost for users with either edge
cache sponsoring or cellular data sponsoring, the CP can
attract more video users and traffic, and hence achieve
certain revenue gain (e.g., via build-in advertisements). When
providing sponsoring for users, the CP needs some budget for
covering the cellular data cost (in cellular data sponsoring)
or caching the video contents on edge network (in edge
cache sponsoring), hence lead to certain revenue loss. Note
that a higher budget for cellular data sponsoring implies that
the CP will sponsor more video contents (for those users
subscribing to the cellular data sponsoring), and a higher CP
budget for edge cache sponsoring implies that the CP will
cache more video contents on edge network (for those users
subscribing to the edge cache sponsoring). Clearly, a higher
budget (effort) for a particular sponsoring scheme can attract
more users to subscribe to it (hence bring more revenue gain
for the CP), but will also introduce more loss to the CP to
offer the sponsoring. Thus, the CP needs to determine the
budget for each sponsoring scheme carefully to balance the
revenue gain and loss.
Given the budgets that the CP offers for both sponsoring
schemes, mobile users will decide whether and which spon-
soring scheme(s) they are going to choose, which lead to the
following four different memberships:
• NoSp: Choosing neither sponsoring scheme;
• CellSp: Choosing cellular data sponsoring;
• EdgeSp: Choosing edge cache sponsoring;
• HybridSp: Choosing both sponsoring scheme.
More specifically, when a user chooses CellSp, his request
will be served by the cellular network, and the cellular data
cost will be covered by the CP with a given probability
(depending on the CP’s budget for cellular data sponsoring).
When a user chooses EdgeSp, his request will be served
by the edge network if the edge cache is available (i.e., the
user is within the edge network and meanwhile the requested
contents have been cached on the edge network). When a
user chooses HybridSp, his video request will be served by
the edge network if the edge cache is available, or otherwise,
by the cellular network and the cellular data cost will be
covered by the CP with a given probability.
Game theory [14] has been widely used in wireless
networks (e.g., [15]–[20]) for modeling and analyzing the
competitive and cooperative interactions among different net-
work entities. We formulate the interactions of the CP and
the users as a two-stage Stackelberg game [14], where the
CP acts as game leader determining the budgets for both
sponsoring schemes in Stage I, and the users act as game
followers deciding which membership they would like to
choose. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE)
of the proposed game systematically. In summary, the key
contributions of this works are given below.
• Novel Model: This work analyzes the scenario where
both cellular data sponsoring and edge caching are
provided to users simultaneously. Our model captures
many important features of practical systems, such as
the content popularity and user heterogeneity.
• Game-Theoretic Analysis: We formulate the problem as
a Stackelberg game and provide a comprehensive game
theoretic analysis. We prove the uniqueness and exis-
tence of equilibrium in Stage II, and employ numerical
method to obtain equilibrium in Stage I.
• Experiments and Insights: We conduct extensive exper-
iments to evaluate the system performance. The experi-
ment results show that by introducing the edge caching,
the CP can increase his revenue by 105%. Users with
high probability to meet an edge device prefer the edge
cache sponsoring.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model. In Section III, we provide
the game formulation. In Section IV, we provide the game
equilibrium analysis. We provide simulation results in Section
V, and conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a single CP providing video service to a set
U = {1, 2, ..., U} of mobile users. The CP can deliver video
contents to mobile users in two different ways:
• Cellular Direct Delivery: The video content (located in
the remote server) will be delivered to the user through
the cellular link directly;
• Edge Cache Delivery: The video content is cached in
the edge network in advance, and will be delivered to
the (nearby) users through the local link.
Each user moves and requests video contents randomly
according to his own pattern. Let S = {1, 2, ..., S} denote
the set of all video contents.
To enable the edge cache delivery, the CP needs to cache
the video contents in the edge network devices (at the
corresponding locations) in advance. Thus, a video request
can be delivered via the edge network only when the user is
within the edge network and the requested content is cached.
B. CP Model
The CP’s goal is to maximize his total sponsoring revenue,
which depends on the revenue loss induced by the budget
and the obtained revenue gain from the sponsoring. The CP
optimizes his revenue via managing the budgets in sponsoring
schemes. When a user’s request is sponsored through cellular
delivery, the CP will cover the cellular data cost for the user.
We denote the cellular data cost of one request for the CP as
h1. The total cost spent on cellular sponsoring is proportional
to the total data volume of cellular sponsored requests. We
denote the cellular sponsor effort as α1, hence the total cost in
cellular sponsoring is h1α1. The cost in edge cache delivery
is the storage cost of cached contents. We denote h2 as the
edge cache cost for one content per time period. We denote
the edge cache sponsor effort as α2, hence the total cost in
edge cache sponsoring is h2α2.
Moreover, if a content is sponsored (either via cellular
sponsoring or edge cache sponsoring), it will be delivered
to the user with certain attachment (e.g., build-in advertise-
ments) called value-added content, hence can bring revenue
gain for the CP. We define the average revenue gain of a
request for the CP as u.
C. User Model
Considering the heterogeneity of users in mobility pattern
and service request pattern, we define the probability that
a user is covered by the edge network as ru ∈ [0, 1], and
the probability to request a content as fu ∈ [0, 1]. In reality,
to allow the user to estimate his mobility probability and
request probability, we assume that the CP will announce
the related information at the beginning. Specifically, the CP
will announce the locations to place the edge caching devices,
and the content caching rule, e.g., the CP will cache the latest
popular TV series and talk shows. After the announcement
made by the CP, the users can estimate the above probabilities
based on their mobility and request patterns.
In this work, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where
users with the same type (f, r) will always make the same
membership choice. Moreover, we focus on the user pure-
strategy behavior where each user will choose a specific
membership under a given network situation. Namely, a
user makes his membership choice among NoSp, CellSp,
EdgeSp, andHybridSp. For notation convenience, we denote
the membership as m ∈ {N,C,E,H}, correspondingly.
We denote ΘN , ΘC , ΘE , and ΘH as the sets of users
choosing NoSp, CellSp, EdgeSp, and HybridSp. Hence, the
percentages of C, E, and H users are: µC =
|ΘC |
U
, µE =
|ΘE |
U
, µH =
|ΘH |
U
.
The payoff of each user is the achieved benefit minus
the incurred cost. For convenience, we denote the payoff of
a type-(f, r) user under membership m as V(f,r)(m). The
objective of the user is to choose the proper membership to
maximize his payoff.
1) NoSp: A user choosing neither sponsoring scheme can-
not connect to any sponsoring network. As a user choosing
NoSp has no cost or revenue in the sponsoring network, we
set the user payoff as zero:
V(f,r)(N) = 0. (1)
2) CellSp: A user choosing the cellular data sponsoring
can connect to the cellular sponsoring network at any loca-
tions for any contents. Due to the cellular budget constraint
of the CP, the probability that a content request is sponsored
via cellular network is P (derived in Section III-C). Then,
the expected payoff (per time slot) of a type-(f, r) user is
V(f,r)(C) = f · P · (v − c1)− φ1, (2)
where v is the average benefit of a user request, c1 is the
average energy cost of a request, and φ1 is the cost of joining
the CellSp (e.g., time-average energy cost). Note that we
assume that the user benefit and the user cost are of the same
unit.
3) EdgeSp: A cache sponsored user can only connect to
the sponsor network only when he is within the edge network
and requests the cached video content [21]. If a user is
sponsored from the edge network, the video is delivered from
the edge device to the user via local network connection. Let
ρ denote the probability of a user requesting a cached content
in a time slot (derived in Section III-C). Then, the expected
payoff (per time slot) of a type-(f, r) user is:
V(f,r)(E) = r · f · ρ · (v − c2)− φ2, (3)
where r is the user mobility factor, v is the average value
of a request for the user, c2 is the average energy cost of a
request via the edge network, and φ2 is the cost of joining
the EdgeSp.
4) HybridSp: A user can choose to join both the two
sponsoring schemes. When he is within the cache region and
hits the cached content, he can employ the edge cache deliv-
ery. Otherwise, he will compete for the cellular sponsoring.
Hence, the expected payoff (per time slot) of a type-(f, r)
user is:
V(f,r)(H) = (f−r·f ·ρ)·P ·(v−c1)+r·f ·ρ·(v−c2)−φ1−φ2,
(4)
III. GAME FORMULATION
Based on the system model above, we formulate the
interaction between the CP and mobile users as a two-stage
Stackelberg game.
In Stage I, the CP decides the sponsor budgets (efforts)
of cellular and edge cache sponsoring: α1, α2, respectively,
to maximize the expected profit. We employ the widely-
adopted contracted sponsoring for cellular sponsoring like in
[22]. The CP will pay a fixed fee α1h1 at first. Thus the
expected revenues (per time slot) of the cellular and edge
cache sponsoring are
UC(α1, α2) = u · P ·NC − α1h1, (5)
UE(α1, α2) = u ·NE − α2h2, (6)
where u is the CP revenue defined in Section II-B, NC and
NE denote the expected requests in cellular sponsoring and
edge cache sponsoring, respectively, P denotes the probabil-
ity for users to get sponsoring in the cellular network. Hence
we can define the sum CP revenue as
U(α1, α2) = UC(α1, α2) + UE(α1, α2), (7)
Keep in mind that NC , NE , and P are all functions of
(α1, α2) derived in Stage II.
In Stage II, users determine their memberships (i.e., NoSp,
CellSp, EdgeSp, or HybridSp), given the budgets α1 and α2
announced by the CP in Stage I. Note that users’ decisions
are coupled. For example, with more users choosing CellSp,
the user payoff of cellular sponsor will decrease (due to a
smaller sponsor probability P ), resulting in the payoff gain
in edge cache sponsor. Similarly, with more users choosing
EdgeSp, the payoff of the cellular sponsoring will increase
(due to a larger sponsor probability P ).
Next, we will study the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) of the proposed two-stage Stackelberg game. We show
the definition of the SPE in Definition 1.
Definition 1: A strategy profile {(α∗1, α
∗
2), (m
∗(f, r), ∀r ∈
[0, 1], f ∈ [0, 1]}, where (α∗1, α
∗
2) is the CP’s strategy in Stage
I and m∗(f, r) is a type-(f, r) user’s strategy in Stage II, is
an SPE if and only if:

Stage II :V(f,r)(m
∗(f, r)) ≥ V(f,r)(m),
∀r ∈ [0, 1], f ∈ [0, 1],m ∈ {C,E,H,N};
Stage I :U(α∗1, α
∗
2) ≥ U(α
′
1, α
′
2),
∀α1 ∈ [αmin, αmax], α2 ∈ [αmin, αmax],
(8)
where α′1, α
′
2 are all the other budget selections, αmin, αmax
are the lower bound and upper bound of the sponsor budget,
respectively. For fairness, we set the budget bounds of cellular
sponsoring and edge cache sponsoring as the same.
We will derive the SPE by backward induction. Namely,
we first study the user membership selection game in Stage
II, and derive the users’ equilibrium decisions. Then we
characterize the optimal budgets of the CP to maximize his
profit in Stage I.
A. Stage II: User Membership Selection
As discussed previously, the sets of users choosing NoSp,
CellSp, EdgeSp, and HybridSp are already in the system
(i.e., ΦN , ΦC , ΦE , ΦH ) and their corresponding percentages
(i.e., µN , µC , µE and µH ) will affect the value of P ,
and further affect the user payoff and membership selection.
Hence, we will first study what is the user’s best mem-
bership decision under a particular membership distribution
{ΦN ,ΦC ,ΦE ,ΦH}. Then we will study how the user mem-
bership decision dynamically evolves over time, and what
is the stable membership distribution (called membership
selection equilibrium).
Given the CP’s strategy (α1, α2), and under a particular
initial membership distribution {ΦN ,ΦC ,ΦE ,ΦH}, the pay-
off of a type-(f, r) user is:
V(f,r)(m) =


0, m = N,
(v − c1)Pf − φ1, m = C,
(v − c2)ρfr − φ2, m = E,
(v − c2)ρfr + (v − c1)Pf−
(v − c1)Pρfr − φ1 − φ2, m = H.
(9)
A type-(f, r) user will choose (i) CellSp, if and only if
V(f,r)(m = C) ≥ max{0, V(f,r)(E), V(f,r)(H)}, (10)
(ii) EdgeSp, if and only if
V(f,r)(m = E) ≥ max{0, V(f,r)(C), V(f,r)(H)}, (11)
(iii) HybridSp, if and only if
V(f,r)(m = H) ≥ max{0, V(f,r)(C), V(f,r)(E)}, (12)
and (iv) HybridSp if the above conditions are not satisfied.
B. Stage I: CP Budget Selection
Given any CP’s strategy (α1, α2), the cellular sponsor
probability P ∗(α1, α2), the number of user requests for
cellular sponsor and edge cache sponsor N∗C(α1, α2) and
N∗E(α1, α2) are achieved under the NE. Hence, we can
formulate the CP payoff maximization problem as
max
α1,α2
X∗C(α1, α2) +X
∗
L(α1, α2)− α1h1 − α2h2, (13)
where X∗C(α1, α2) = uN
∗
C(α1, α2)P
∗(α1, α2) and
X∗L(α1, α2) = uN
∗
E(α1, α2).
C. Derivation of Important Variables
Before studying the game equilibrium, we first derive the
values of ρ, NC , NE , and P analytically.
1) Calculation of ρ (Cached Video Content Probability):
We assume that the distribution of video requests follows Zipf
distribution: g(s), s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S}. Given the budget α2 of
edge cache sponsoring, we can derive the probability that a
user requests a cached video content by:
ρ =
α2∑
1
g(s) ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
Note that ρ relies on the content number the CP decides to
cache on each edge device.
2) Calculation of NC and NE (Expected Sponsoring
Requests): Given the users who choose CellSp, EdgeSp,
and HybridSp, i.e., ΘC , ΘE , and ΘH , we can calculate the
expected sponsoring request number:
NC =
∑
u∈ΘC
fu +
∑
u∈ΘH
(fu − ru · fu · ρ), (15)
NE =
∑
u∈ΘE∪ΘH
ru · fu · ρ. (16)
3) Calculation of P (Sponsor Probabilities): Given the
budget α1 of cellular data sponsoring, the probability of users
choosing CellSp or HybridSp can be computed as
P =
⌈
α1
NC
⌉1
, (17)
where ⌈x⌉1 = max(x, 1).
IV. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We now analyze the game equilibrium by using backward
induction in this Section.
A. User Selection Game in Stage II
1) Analysis of the NE: Based on the user payoff formu-
lated in (9), we analyze user selection distribution to get
insight into the NE. We assume that φ1 = φ2 = φ, as
the energy spent to keep the communication with the CP
is the same. Furthermore, we define δ1 = (v − c1)P and
δ2 = (v − c2)ρ as the instant payoff of delivery networks.
Hence, the user payoffs under different memberships can be
reformulated as:
V(f,r)(m) =


0, m = N,
δ1f − φ, m = C,
δ2fr − φ, m = E.
(δ2 − δ1ρ)fr + δ1f − 2φ, m = H
(18)
We can derive the user’s selection policy as below. The
mobile user will choose:
• m=N, if and only if f < φ
δ1
, rf < φ
δ2
.1
• m=C, if and only if f > φ
δ1
, δ1− δ2r > 0 and φ− (δ2−
δ1ρ)fr > 0.
• m=E, if and only if fr > φ
δ2
, δ2r − δ1 > 0 and φ +
δ1ρfr − δ1f > 0.
• m=H, if and only if φ− (δ2− δ1ρ)fr < 0, φ+ δ1ρfr−
δ1f < 0 and (δ2 − δ1ρ)fr + δ1f − 2φ > 0.
We note that only when δi ≥ φ, i = {1, 2} exists, the
sponsor via different networks benefit mobile users. Once
δ1, δ2 are determined under the NE, we can derive the payoffs
of a type-(f, r) user under different memberships.
To facilitate the later analysis, we introduce the concept of
indifferent point (on the user type).
Definition 2: An indifferent point is such a type-(f, r)
on which users will achieve the same payoff when selecting
different memberships.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are two kinds of indifferent
points: (i) the type-(f, r) where users will achieve the same
payoff under NoSp, CellSp, and EdgeSp, and (2) the type-
(f, r) where users will achieve the same payoff under Hy-
bridSp, CellSp, and EdgeSp. Specifically,
1) NoSp, CellSp, and EdgeSp are the optimal member-
ship selection for type-(f, r) users where{
δ1f − φ = 0
δ2fr − φ = 0
(19)
2) CellSp, EdgeSp, and HybridSp are the optimal mem-
bership selection for type-(f, r) users where{
δ1f − φ = δ2fr − φ
φ+ δ1ρfr − δ1f = 0
(20)
We denote these two points as N1 and N2, respectively,
where N1 = (f
∗, r∗) = ( φ
δ1
, δ1
δ2
) and N2 = (
f∗
1−ρr∗ , r
∗). Next
we discuss the existences of N1 and N2.
1) Users will select CellSp and EdgeSp, if and only if
N1 exists and N2 does not exist.
2) Users will select CellSp, EdgeSp and HybridSp, if
and only if when both N1 and N2 exist.
The user divisions in these two types of NE are illustrated
in Fig. 1. We can see that users with large f and r prefer
edge cache sponsoring, and users with large f and small r
prefer cellular sponsoring.
2) Membership Distribution Dynamics: Obviously, under
the user best membership selection, the newly derived mem-
bership distributions may be different from the initial one.
We denote the newly derived membership distribution by
{Θ′N ,Θ
′
C ,Θ
′
E ,Θ
′
H}, and the associated membership percent-
ages as {µ′N , µ
′
C , µ
′
E , µ
′
H}.
The membership distribution continues evolving over time,
until it reaches a stable distribution (called membership
1The third condition that (δ2 − δ1ρ)rf + δ1f − 2φ < 0 is covered by
the former two conditions, since we have (δ2 − δ1ρ)rf + δ1f − 2φ <
(δ1f − φ) + (δ2fr − φ) < 0
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Fig. 1. User Divisions in NE with “Hybrid” and without “Hybrid”.
selection equilibrium), where no user has the incentive to
change his choice. Now we study the membership distribution
dynamics, and characterize the membership selection equilib-
rium in Stage II.
Suppose that each user selects membership once in each
time slot. Without loss of generality, we consider the mem-
bership distribution change in a generic time slot t. Let
{ΘtN ,Θ
t
C ,Θ
t
E ,Θ
t
H} denote the initial membership distribu-
tion at the beginning of slot t, and {Θt+1N ,Θ
t+1
C ,Θ
t+1
E ,Θ
t+1
H }
denote the newly derived membership distribution in time slot
t (after one round best response update). An equilibrium is
characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: A membership distribution {ΘtN ,Θ
t
C ,Θ
t
E ,
ΘtH} is a membership selection equilibrium if and only if
Θt+1N = Θ
t
N ,Θ
t+1
C = Θ
t
C ,Θ
t+1
E = Θ
t
E ,Θ
t+1
H = Θ
t
H .
This implies that if {ΘtN ,Θ
t
C ,Θ
t
E,Θ
t
H} is a membership
selection equilibrium, then we will have: Θτm = Θ
t
m, ∀m ∈
{N,C,E,H}, for all τ > t.
Theorem 1: There exists unique pure-strategy Nash Equi-
librium (NE) in Stage II.
B. CP Budget Decision in Stage I
Now we analyze the optimal decision of the CP in Stage
I, given the NE of Stage II. Such analysis will lead to the
SPE of the entire two-stage game.
We design a numerical method to solve the problem as
follows. We can check that the CP’s optimization problem is
non-convex. Hence, it is difficult to obtain the closed form
solution of the optimal budgets (α∗1, α
∗
2). Fortunately, the
problem is a two variable optimization problem with box
constraint sets, and can be solved using numerical methods.
In this work, we solve the optimal budgets for the CP in a
sequential manner: First, solve the optimal cellular budget
α∗1(α2) under any α2 and the optimal α
∗
2(α1) under any α1
through one-dimensional search; Then,
Proposition 2: The CP’s best strategy (α∗1, α
∗
2) must occur
at an intersection point of α∗1(α2) and α
∗
2(α1).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We perform numerical studies in a mobile network, and
verify the equilibrium analysis. We simulate a system in
which there are 10,000 mobile video users, and choose system
parameters as follows: v = 3, c1 = 1.5, c2 = 1, φ = 0.1,
u = 3, h1 = 1.5, h2 = 2, S = 1000, α1 = 2000, and
α2 = 2000.
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A. Discussion on Parameters
We first discuss the impact of user sponsor revenue on
users’ sponsor membership decision. The user sponsor rev-
enue is measured by the per sponsor revenue v. Fig. 2 demon-
strates the user membership percentages under different user
sponsor revenue v. We can see from Fig. 2 that the percentage
of HybridSp users is monotone increasing with v, because
the sponsorship becomes more beneficial to users, which
attracts users to join both sponsorships. We notice that µN is
monotone decreasing with v. From the CP’s perspective, in
order to attract more users to utilize the sponsorship schemes,
the CP should know which contents are most valuable to users
and sponsor the users with free request to the contents.
Then, we discuss the parameter c1, i.e., the per sponsor
cost in CellSp. Fig. 3 show the user membership percentages
under different cellular sponsor cost c1. We can observe from
Fig. 3 that the percentage of users selecting CellSp decreases
and that of users selecting EdgeSp increases with c1. This is
because users need to bear higher cost in CellSp, and hence
some of them switch to EdgeSp with relatively lower cost.
Note that when c1 ≥ 3, no user will choose CellSp.
B. Dynamic User Selection and Algorithm in Stage II
Fig. 4 shows the process of dynamic member selection
in Stage II. Specifically, it illustrates the dynamics of mem-
bership percentages µN , µC , µE , and µH . In this exam-
ple, the membership dynamics converge to the equilibrium
within about 10 iterations, the membership percentage is
µN = 0.09, µC = 0.28, µE = 0.21, µH = 0.42.
C. CP’s Decision and Revenue in Stage I
We now discuss how the CP can optimizes its budgets.
Specifically, the CP can determine the proper α1 and α2 based
on the users’ equilibrium sponsorship selections.
Fig. 5 shows the contours of CP revenue with respect to
α1 and α2. In this case, the optimal budgets are α
∗
1 = 0.2
and α∗2 = 0.26. Furthermore, we investigate the CP’s revenue
under pure cellular sponsoring, pure cache sponsoring, and
joint cellular and caching sponsoring in Fig. 6. With proper
budget setting, the joint sponsor schemes can increase its
maximum revenue up to 105% and 85%, respectively, com-
paring with cases with pure cellular sponsoring and pure edge
cache sponsoring.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied how the edge caching will affect
the CP’s data sponsoring strategy as well as the users’
behaviors and the data market. Specifically, we considered
a single CP who offers both the edge caching service and
the data sponsoring service to heterogeneous mobile video
users. We formulated the interactions of the CP and the users
as a two-stage Stackelberg game, with the CP as leader and
the users as followers, and analyzed the sub-game perfect
equilibrium (SPE) systematically. Numerical results showed
that by introducing the edge caching, the CP can increase his
revenue up to 105%.
REFERENCES
[1] Cisco visual networking index: Global mobile data traffic forecast update 2016-
2021, White Paper.
[2] M. Tang, L. Gao, H. Pang, J. Huang, and L. Sun, “Optimizations and Economics
of Crowdsourced Mobile Streaming,” IEEE Communications Magazine, 2017.
[3] L. Gao, M. Tang, H. Pang, J. Huang, and L. Sun, “Performance Bound Analysis
for Crowdsourced Mobile Video Streaming,” in Proc. IEEE CISS, 2016.
[4] M. Tang, S. Wang, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Sun, “MOMD: A Multi-Object
Multi-Dimensional Auction for Crowdsourced Mobile Video Streaming,” in Proc.
IEEE INFOCOM, 2017.
[5] C. Joe-Wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang. “Sponsoring mobile data: An economic
analysis of impact on users and content providers,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2015.
[6] D. Paparas, E. Skiani, Y. Bejerano, and M. Andrews. “On-line profit maximiza-
tion algorithms for managing sponsored content in cellular networks,” in IEEE
Workshop on Smart Data Pricing, 2015.
[7] L. Zhang, W. Wu, and D. Wang. “Sponsored data plan: A two-class service model
in wireless data networks,” in Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS.
[8] http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=25183&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=37366
[9] Q. Ding, H. Pang, and L. Sun, “SAM: Cache space allocation in collaborative
edge-caching network,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, 2017.
[10] M. Tang, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “A general framework for crowdsourcing mobile
communication, computation, and caching,” Proc. IEEE Globecom, 2017
[11] L. Chen, Y. Zhou, M. Jing, and R. Ma, “Thunder crystal: A novel crowdsourcing-
based content distribution platform,” in Proc. ACM NOSSDAV, 2015.
[12] H. Pang, L. Gao, and L. Sun, “Joint Optimization of Data Sponsoring and Edge
Caching for Mobile Video Delivery,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2016.
[13] K. Poularakis, G. Iosifidis, and L. Tassiulas, “A Framework for Mobile Data
Offloading to Leased Cache-Endowed Small Cell Networks,” in Proc. IEEE
MASS, 2014.
[14] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole,, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1993.
[15] L. Gao, X. Wang, Y. Xu, and Q. Zhang, “Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio
Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol.29, no.4, pp.843-855, 2011.
[16] L. Duan, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “Cooperative Spectrum Sharing: A Contract-
based Approach,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.13, no.1, pp.174-
187, 2014.
[17] L. Gao, G. Iosifidis, J. Huang, L. Tassiulas, and D. Li, “Bargaining-based Mobile
Data Offloading,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol.32,
no.6, pp.1114-1125, 2014.
[18] Y. Luo, L. Gao, and J. Huang, “MINE GOLD to Deliver Green Cognitive
Communications,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol.33,
no.12, pp.2749-2760, 2015.
[19] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “Efficient and Fair Collaborative
Mobile Internet Access,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2017.
[20] L. Gao, Y. Xu, and X. Wang, “MAP: Multi-Auctioneer Progressive Auction for
Dynamic Spectrum Access,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol.10,
no.8, pp.1144-1161, 2011.
[21] H. Pang, P. Wang, L. Gao, M. Tang, J. Huang, and L. Sun, “Crowdsourced
mobility prediction based on spatio-temporal contexts.” In Proc. IEEE ICC, 2016.
[22] Y. Jin, M. Reiman, and M. Andrews. “Pricing Sponsored Content in Wireless
Networks with Multiple Content Providers.” in Proc. of IEEE Smart Data Pricing
Workshop, 2015.
